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NOTES
California's Prayer Healing Dilemma
On February 21, 1984 Laurie Walker telephoned Norma
Alpert, an accredited Christian Science practitioner, and asked
Mrs. Alpert, in her capacity as a Christian Science practitioner, to
pray for her four-year-old daughter, Shauntay Walker, who was
sick with symptoms of the flu. Mrs. Alpert agreed to pray for
Shauntay.
For several days thereafter, there did not seem to be much
change in Shauntay's condition. She was unable to retain food.
She didn't want to eat and she wanted to sleep. These symptoms
did not remain constant, however. After February 28, 1984 the
reports Mrs. Alpert was receiving about Shauntay's condition indi-
cated improvement. Shauntay had begun eating again, although
not great amounts, and she was retaining her food. Her bowel
movements were normal. She was drinking liquids frequently-7-
Up and milk ....
On March 8, 1984 at approximately 11:30 p.m., Shauntay be-
gan to breathe heavily and irregularly. Laurie called Mrs. Alpert.
They prayed and Shauntay gradually began to breathe more qui-
etly. After Shauntay's breathing had returned to normal, Laurie
and the practitioner continued praying. Shauntay stopped breath-
ing at about 1:00 a.m. on March 9, 1984.1
Introduction
In 1984, at least three California children died of bacterial meningi-
tis because their parents had refused to seek professional medical help,
and instead relied on prayer healing as the sole treatment for their chil-
dren. The parents, all members of the Christian Science Church, did not
believe in the use of modem medicine.' The parents in each case have
been charged with crimes ranging from child abuse to murder.
1. Defendant's Brief at 18-22, Walker v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 266, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 87, review granted, No. 24996 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 1986).
2. See Walker v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 266, 222 Cal. Rptr. 87, review
granted, No. 24996 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 1986); State v. Glaser, No. A 753942 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Los Angeles County Mar. 29, 1985); State v. Rippberger, No. 13301-C (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sonoma County July 16, 1985).
3. In Walker, Laurie Walker was charged with involuntary manslaughter and felony
child endangerment. In Glaser, Eliot and Lise Glaser were charged with involuntary man-
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Prayer healing is a belief that disease or illness can be cured through
faith in God and prayer alone,4 and its practice is widespread in
America.5 As a tenet of an individual's religious belief, the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution limits the government's ability to
regulate the free exercise of prayer healing.6 Parents, however, do not
have an absolute right to subject their children to prayer healing.7 A
state has a concurrent right and duty to protect the lives of children
within its borders.8 Since the nineteenth century, states have fulfilled
their duty by regulating prayer healing through the enactment of
statutes. 9
Although California has attempted to regulate prayer healing, its
resulting statutory scheme establishes "recognized" religions over unrec-
ognized religions in violation of the Establishment Clause."0 The Califor-
nia statutory scheme also does not adequately warn parents that their
conduct is prohibited. This inadequacy violates the parents' right to due
process under the Federal and California Constitutions."1 Consequently,
California's regulations may interfere with the parents' free exercise of
prayer healing as well as violate the Establishment Clause and the par-
ents' due process rights.
This Note first examines the history of prayer healing and its regula-
tion, and the principles of the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Due
Process Clauses. It next analyzes the California statutes in light of these
principles. Finally, this Note proposes that California amend its statu-
tory scheme to comport with the free exercise and due process rights of
parents who practice prayer healing on their children, and with the
state's duty to abide by the Establishment Clause.
I. The History of Prayer Healing and its Regulation
Since prehistoric times, people have been using prayer to cure ail-
ments. 12 Today, faith healing is practiced worldwide. 3 Three of the
more prominent religious sects practicing prayer healing do not permit
any medical treatment: the Church of God of the Union Assembly, the
slaughter, felony child endangerment, and murder. In Rippberger, Mark Rippberger and Su-
san Middleton were charged with involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment.
4. See Comment, Religious Beliefs and the Criminal Justice System: Some Problems of
the Faith Healer, 8 Loy. L.A.L. Rnv. 396, 397 (1975).
5. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 80-98.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 59-79.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 104-109.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
12. See Comment, supra note 4, at 396.
13. Id.
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Worldwide Church of God, and the Faith Assembly. 14 The opposition to
the use of medicine by the Worldwide Church of God is so strong that
their leader "likens the use of physicians to worship of pagan gods."15
However, the largest faith healing sects, the Christian Scientists and the
Jehovah's Witnesses, do not have such extreme prohibitions on the use of
medicine. Christian Scientists are urged to use prayer to cure all ail-
ments, but are allowed to use modem medicine without risking expulsion
from the church. 6 Jehovah's Witnesses are allowed to use modem
medicine as long as it does not involve the use of blood transfusions.' 7
A. English Regulation of Prayer Healing
The first statutory regulation of prayer healing was England's Poor
Law Amendment Act of July, 1868,8 which provided in part that "when
any Parent shall wilfully neglect to provide adequate Food, Clothing,
Medical Aid, or Lodging for his child ... whereby the Health of such
Child shall have been.., injured, he shall be guilty of an Offence .... -9
In 1894, the English Parliament replaced the Poor Law Amendment
Act by enacting the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 0 which pro-
vided: "If any person ... who has the custody, charge, or care of any
child... wilfully... neglects.., such child,... in a manner likely to
cause such child... injury to its health ... that person shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor.""1 This statute did not specifically mention medical aid,
but provided the same protection for children denied medical care as did
the Poor Law Amendment Act. z
One of the first faith healing cases, Regina v. Wagstaffe,z3 was de-
cided in January of 1868, prior to the enactment of the Poor Law
Amendment Act. Wagstaffe was tried for manslaughter in the death of
his child. As a defense to his failure to provide medical care, Wagstaffe
claimed that pursuant to his religious beliefs, he used prayer instead of
medicine to attempt to cure his ill child. The jury instructions focused on
whether the defendant's religious belief was reasonable. The jury found
Wagstaffe not guilty.24
14. Ostling, Matters of Faith and Death, TIME, Apr. 16, 1984, at 42.
15. Id.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 139-143.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 144-146.
18. 31 & 32 Vict., ch. 122, § 37.
19. Id.
20. 57 & 58 Vict., ch. 41.
21. Id. at § 1.
22. 31 & 32 Vict., ch. 122, § 37.
23. 10 Cox C.C. 530 (1868).
24. Id. See Cawley, CriminalLiability in Faith Healing, 39 MINN. L. Rv. 48, 54 (1954).
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Queen v. Senior25 was decided by the English Queen's Bench in
1899. At the time, England had adopted the Prevention of Cruelty
Act.26 Senior, a member of a faith healing sect called the "Peculiar Peo-
ple," was indicted for manslaughter after refusing to give medical aid to
his nine-month-old infant, who died after contracting diarrhea and pneu-
monia. The trial judge charged Senior with both misdemeanor-man-
slaughter and common-law gross and wanton negligence. Senior was
convicted of manslaughter.27
B. American Regulation of Prayer Healing
In the United States, New York28 and Oklahoma29 enacted statutes
in the early twentieth century that were similar to the English Poor Law
Amendment Act. The American statutes provided misdemeanor penal-
ties for willfully omitting to furnish medical attendance to a minor.30
Other American states soon enacted similar laws. 31 Later, in the 1970's,
states began enacting religious exemptions to these statutes which penal-
ize parents who fail to provide medical care for their children. Today,
forty states have enacted some type of religious exemption.32
25. 1 Q.B. 283 (1899). Queen v. Senior is considered the leading English decision in this
area today. See Cawley, supra note 24, at 55.
26. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
27. 1 Q.B. 283 (1899). For a more detailed history of English and Canadian cases in the
prayer healing area, see Trescher & O'Neill, Medical Care for Dependent Children: Man-
slaughter Liability of the Christian Scientist, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 203, 205-08 (1960); Cawley,
supra note 24, at 54-57.
28. See, e.g., People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 202, 68 N.E. 243, 244 (1903).
29. See, e.g., Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 P. 345 (1911).
30. See, e.g., Pierson, 176 N.Y. at 202, 68 N.E. at 244; Owens, 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 P.
345 (1911).
31. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); State v. Sandford,
99 Me. 441, 59 A. 597 (1904).
32. ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(2) (1975 & Supp. 1984), § 13A-13-6(b) (1982 & Supp. 1986);
ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120(b) (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (8)(c) (1974); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 42-807(c) (1977 & Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1987);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-114 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38d (West 1975); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1104 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(7)(f) (West Supp. 1985); HA-
WAII REV. STAT. § 350-4 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-401(2) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,
§ 2054 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1- 4(a), 5(c) (Supp. 1981); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 726.6 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608(1)(c) (1981); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:403(B)(4) (West 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4010 (Supp. 1986); MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-701(g)(2) (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 1 (West
Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.634 (1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-1050)(i),
(in) (1972 & Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 41-3-102(4) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.5085 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169-C:3, XIX (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:6-1.1 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-
3(L)(4), (M)(4) (1981); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15 (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
517(21) (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.1 (1981); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.22(A) (Anderson 1982 & Supp. 1984), § 2151.421 (Anderson 1976 & Supp. 1984),
§ 2151.03 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West Supp. 1984-85); OR. REV.
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At first, American courts inconsistently decided faith healing cases.
In 1903, the New York Court of Appeals decided People v. Pierson.33
Pierson, a member of the Christian Catholic Church of Chicago, believed
in prayer healing; he was indicted for willfully, maliciously, and unlaw-
fully omitting to furnish medical care for his child who died from pneu-
monia. The court held that the statute under which he was charged was
constitutional: 34 the practice of prayer healing was inconsistent with the
peace and safety of the state, which "involve[s] the protection of the lives
and health of its children, as well as the obedience to its laws. ' '35 Pier-
son was found guilty of manslaughter.
Seventeen years later, in Bradley v. State, 6 the Florida Supreme
Court found the faith healing defendant Bradley not guilty of man-
slaughter, even though he failed to provide medical treatment for his
burned child.37
By the mid-twentieth century, most states followed the New York
view in Pierson, and overruled faith healing defenses where a statute im-
posed an affirmative duty on adults to provide medical aid to children.38
Two cases, Mitchell v. Davis39 and Craig v. State,' exemplify this trend.
In Mitchell v. Davis, a Texas court in 1947 held that a parent's opposition
to his or her child's medical treatment based on the parent's religious
beliefs did not constitute a defense to prosecution for breach of a statu-
tory duty to furnish such treatment to the child.4' The court declared
that "conscientious obedience to what the individual may consider a
higher power or authority must yield to the law of the land where duties
of this character are involved." 42 In 1959, Maryland also followed the
Pierson rule in Craig v. State. Craig, a member of the Church of God
who practiced faith healing, was found criminally liable for the death of
his six-month-old daughter because of his refusal to provide her with
medical care. The court rejected Craig's claim that his failure to act was
STAT. § 419.500(1) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40-11-15 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(B), (C)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-1.1 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-19.5 (Supp. 1983); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 682(3)(C) (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 16.1- 228(A)(2) (1982 & Supp.
1984); W. VA. CODE § 49-1-3(g)(2)(A) (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)(4)
(West Supp. 1984-85); WYo. STAT. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) (1978).
33. 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
34. Id. at 202, 68 N.E. at 244.
35. Id. at 204, 68 N.E. at 246.
36. 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920).
37. The court in Bradley reasoned that "the absence of medical attention did not cause
'the killing' of the child, even if the failure or refusal of the father to provide medical attention
was 'culpable negligence' within the intent of the statute." Id. at 653, 84 So. at 679.
38. Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 27, at 208-12.
39. 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
40. 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959).
41. 205 S.W.2d at 815.
42. Id.
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constitutionally protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.43
The growing reliability of modem medicine in the mid-twentieth
century may have led to the near consensus of states which followed Pier-
son. For instance, in 1904, an Indiana state court stated:
It is undisputed that medicine, as a science, is now, and has been
for a long period of time, generally recognized by law, and the effi-
cacy of medical treatment by a skilled and competent physician is
universally conceded. The religious doctrine or belief of a person
cannot be recognized or accepted as a justification or excuse for
his committing an act which is a criminal offense under the law of
the land.'
C. California's Statutory Regulation of Prayer Healing
1. Regulation and Proscription
In 1872, California enacted Penal Code section 270, which provided:
"Every parent of any child who wilfully omits, without lawful excuse, to
perform any duty imposed upon him by law, to furnish necessary food,
clothing, shelter, or medical attention for such child, is guilty of a misde-
meanor."45 In 1925, the legislature amended section 27046 by adding the
phrase "or other remedial care"'47 after "medical attendance" in an at-
tempt to exempt faith healing parents.
In 1967, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Arnold,4"
the state's first prayer healing case under Penal Code section 270. Flo-
rence Ada Arnold was prosecuted for manslaughter in the death of her
thirteen-year-old daughter, Sandra. Instead of providing medical care,
Arnold, a member of the Church of the First Born, treated her in daugh-
ter by spiritual means in accordance with her religious tenets. The trial
court found Arnold guilty of manslaughter based on the misdemeanor-
manslaughter rule.49 The California Supreme Court held that under Pe-
nal Code section 270, the "other remedial care" provision of the 1925
amendment did not sanction unorthodox substitutes for medical attend-
43. 220 Md. at 601-02, 155 A.2d at 690-91. See also State v. Sandford, 99 Me. 441, 59 A.
597 (1904); Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 P. 345 (1911).
44. State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 96, 71 N.E. 197, 199 (1904).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (1872) (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West
Supp. 1987)).
46. Cal. Assem. Bill No. 1825 (1925).
47. 1925 Cal. Stat., ch. 325, § 1, p. 544. See infra text accompanying note 50.
48. 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
49. The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule raises a charge of a misdemeanor to involuntary
manslaughter if the misdemeanor results in homicide. See K. REDDEN & E. VERON, MODERN




ance; 50 however, the court overturned her conviction because the trial
court had erroneously admitted the defendant's statement into
evidence.51
In 1976, the California Legislature amended section 270 of the Penal
Code to include the following exception: "If a parent provides a minor
with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance
with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomi-
nation, by a duly accredited practitioner thereof, such treatment shall
constitute 'other remedial care', as used in this section."52 Walker v. Su-
perior Court,53 State v. Glaser,54 and State v. Rippberger55 are the first
prayer healing cases to be tried since the 1976 amendment of Penal Code
section 270. Therefore, these cases afford the first judicial interpretation
of the language of the 1976 amendment.
2. Statutory Defense in Prayer Healing Cases
The primary issue in prayer healing cases is whether parents have a
statutory defense to charges of involuntary manslaughter 6 or felony
child abuse.57 California Penal Code section 270 imposes misdemeanor
penalties on adults who fail to provide medical care to their children.
The purpose of the statute is to ensure that a parent fulfills his or her
duty to provide care for his or her child.58 California Penal Code section
50. 66 Cal. 2d at 452, 426 P.2d at 524, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
51. Id.
52. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1987).
53. 185 Cal. App. 3d 266, 222 Cal. Rptr. 87, review granted, No. 24996 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 27, 1986).
54. No. A 753942 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County Jan. 10, 1985).
55. No. 13301-C (Cal. Super. Ct., Sonoma County July 16, 1985).
56. The statute provides in part:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three
kinds:
(a) Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
(b) Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to fel-
ony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner, or without due caution and circumspection. This subdivision shall not ap-
ply to acts committed in the driving of a vehicle.
(c) Vehicular ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Supp. 1987).
57. The statute provides in part:
(1) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bod-
ily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any
child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to be injured, or
permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person or health is endan-
gered, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or in
the state prison for 2, 4, or 6 years.
Id. at § 273a.
58. Id at § 270 (West Supp. 1985).
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273a59 imposes felony charges on adults who abuse their children. The
purpose of the statute, in contrast to section 270, is to protect children
from life-threatening situations.60
When the legislature amended Penal Code section 270 in 1976, it
was aware' of a conflict between the section 270 exemption for religious
healing and the absence of such an exemption in Penal Code sections
273a and 192.62 Under section 270, a parent can satisfy the obligation to
provide medical care if she uses spiritual treatment. However, under
sections 273a and 192, a parent can be held criminally liable if the child
suffers harm from prayer healing. During the legislation's pending en-
actment, the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice stated:
The bill appears unclear in two respects. First, section 273a makes
it a [felony] for any person to permit a minor under his care or
custody to suffer any physical harm or injury. Thus, though the
parents may not be liable for failing to provide for the health of the
child because they choose treatment by prayer rather than com-
mon medical treatment, they would be liable if the child suffered
any physiological harm. Second, no exception is made under the
manslaughter statutes for parental liability should the child die. If
treatment by prayer is to be recognized in part, the parents
[s]hould not be liable for the results of using a permitted mode of
healing.63
After pointing out the conflict between permitting the use of prayer
healing and punishing parents whose children die after receiving only
prayer healing as treatment, the legislature failed to provide a religious
defense to the section 273a felony child abuse offense. The legislature's
failure to enact indicates its intent not to provide a religious defense to
felony child abuse charges. 6"
In fact, the legislative intent can be further inferred from its entire
removal of a proposed Welfare and Institutions Code section from the
final version of the bill amending Penal Code section 270 in 1976.5 The
proposed Welfare and Institutions Code section read: "No child who in
good faith is under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer
alone.., shall, for that reason alone, be considered a person described by
Section 600 [which makes certain children dependents of Juvenile Court
instead of their parents]."' 66 The legislature, by failing to enact this pro-
59. See infra text accompanying note 63.
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West Supp. 1987).
61. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT ON As-
SEMBLY BILL 3843 (1976) [hereinafter ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE REPORT]; CALIFORNIA SEN-
ATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, REPORT ON ASSEMBLY BILL 3843 (1976).
62. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Supp. 1987) (manslaughter).
63. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 61, at 1-2.
64. Place v. Trent, 27 Cal. App. 3d 526, 530, 103 Cal. Rptr. 841, 845 (1984).
65. Cal. Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 3843 (1975-76 Reg. Sess.) (August 4, 1976).
66. Id. (June 11, 1976).
posed section, indicated that children whose lives are in danger can be
declared dependents of the court even if their parents claim spiritual
treatment as a defense.67
California Penal Code section 11165,68 and Welfare and Institutions
Code sections 16509.169 and 18950.571 state that no child who is pro-
vided spiritual treatment shall "for that reason alone" be considered ne-
glected or abused. Although this seems to provide some respite for
parents who practice prayer healing on their children, the Colorado
Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "for that reason alone" in a child
neglect statute71 similar to California's as restricting the religious defense
to situations in which the child's life was not threatened by the parent's
failure to provide medical care.72 Under the Colorado approach, a child
may be declared neglected or abused if the omission of medical care
would result in serious harm to the child.73
Furthermore, in 1978 the California Legislature passed Welfare and
67. See Letter from George H. Mtirphy to the Honorable John T. Knox (May 24, 1976)
(discussing Cal. Assem. Bill No. 3843).
68. This statute provides:
(1) "Severe neglect" means ... those situations of neglect where any person
having the care or custody of a child willfully causes or permits the person or health
of the child to be placed in a situation such that his or her person or health is endan-
gered ... including the intentional failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter,
or medical care.
(2) "General neglect" means the negligent failure of a person having the care or
custody of a child to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or super-
vision where no physical injury to the child has occurred.
For the purposes of this chapter [Control of Crimes and Criminals], a child
receiving treatment by spiritual means as provided in Section 16509.1 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code or not receiving specified medical treatment for religious rea-
sons, shall not for that reason alone be considered a neglected child....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165 (West Supp. 1987).
69. This statute states:
No child who in good faith is under treatment solely by spiritual means through
prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious
denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof shall, for that reason alone, be
considered to have been neglected within the purview of this chapter [State Child
Welfare Services].
CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 16509.1 (West Supp. 1987).
70. This statute states: "For the purposes of this chapter [Child Abuse Prevention], a
child receiving treatment by spiritual means... shall not for that reason alone be considered
an abused or neglected child." Id. at § 18950.5.
71. The Colorado statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no child who in good faith is under
treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and
practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited prac-
titioner thereof shall, for that reason alone, be considered to have been neglected
within the purview of this title.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-114 (1973) (1978 Repl. Vol. 8, § 114).
72. People ex rel. D.L.E. (D.L.E. II), 645 P.2d 271, 274 (Colo. 1982).
73. Id. at 274-75. See also In re Edward C., 126 Cal. App. 3d 193, 178 Cal. Rptr. 694
(1981); In re Angela P., 28 Cal. App. 3d 908, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1981).
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Institutions Code section 300.5,74 which explicitly allows judicial inter-
vention to protect a child in need of medical care- even where the par-
ent is providing spiritual treatment.75 Thus, the legislature has clearly
recognized that religious treatment is not a complete defense where a
child's life is in danger, and that the court may exercise the state's parens
patriae power to protect the child.
Finally, when closely examining Penal Code section 270, it appears
to confine the religious exemption to misdemeanor charges against par-
ents for failing to provide for their children. Section 270 states that
"such [spiritual] treatment shall constitute 'other remedial care,' as used
in this section."' 76 This exemption, combined with the legislative history,
can only be interpreted by courts to apply solely to section 270.7 7 Thus,
no statutory exemption exists to charges of involuntary manslaughter78
or felony child abuse79 in prayer healing cases.
II. Free Exercise, Establishment of Religion, and Due Process
A. The Free Exercise of Religious Beliefs
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ."0 The First Amendment is
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.81
The Free Exercise Clause was designed to guarantee individual freedom
to practice religion,82 and it prohibits the government from unnecessarily
burdening individuals because of their religious beliefs:83 "the free exer-
cise clause is a mandate of religious voluntarism."84 In enacting the Free
Exercise Clause the Drafters' purpose was "'to state an objective, not to
write a statute.' "I' Hence, courts have developed rules and principles to
74. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300.5 (West 1984).
75. Id.
76. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
77. Cf. Walker v. Superior Court, in which the court overruled the defendant's motion for
dismissal. Justice Sims' concurring opinion states:
Penal Code section 270 contains no exemption from the parental duty to supply med-
ical attention for a child. Our Supreme Court [in People v. Arnold] has ruled that the
duty to supply "other remedial care," imposed by section 270, is in addition to, not a
substitute for, the statute's duty to supply medical attention. Consequently, I do not
agree with the majority's suggestion that section 270 may contain a "faith healing
exemption."
185 Cal. App. 3d at 283, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (Sims, J., concurring).
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Supp. 1987).
79. Id. at § 273a.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
81. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
82. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 719 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
83. See id.; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
84. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 818 (1978).
85. Id. at 813 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 668).
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maintain the spirit of the Drafters' intent.8 6
While the freedom to believe in any religious faith is absolute, 7 the
freedom to exercise that belief is not absolute 8 and must be tempered by
the interest in the general public welfare.89 As long as religious beliefs
are not restricted, the government may legislate to a certain extent in
areas that interfere with religious practices: "Laws are made for the gov-
ernment of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices."9
In 1878, the Supreme Court decided Reynolds v. United States,91 in
which it convicted Reynolds of violating a bigamy statute: knowing that
his wife was still alive, Reynolds married another woman in Utah. The
Court rejected his defense that his actions were based on his religious
beliefs as a member of the Mormon Church, which advocated polygamy.
The Court held that such a defense was no justification for committing
an overt criminal act.9 2
Since Reynolds, courts have attempted to distinguish between reli-
gious beliefs and religious practices by balancing the individual's reli-
gious interest against the substantiality of the state's interest, or the
compelling state interest.93 If the state's interest does not outweigh the
individual's religious interest, then the state's action violates the Free Ex-
ercise Clause.94
As a general proposition, minors lack the capacity to make decisions
affecting their basic constitutional rights: "[T]here is a general recogni-
tion of the fact that many persons by reason of their youth are incapable
of intelligent decision, as the result of which public policy demands legal
protection of their personal as well as their property rights." 95 Few
courts recognize that children have a separate constitutional interest in-
dependent from their parents or the state unless the child is deemed old
enough to participate in decisions affecting her.96 Courts must therefore
balance two perceptions of the child's best interest: the parents' religious
and child-rearing interests and the state's interest as parens patriae. As
86. Id.
87. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
88. Id.
89. Id. See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); In re Appeal in Cochise
County, 133 Ariz. 165, 650 P.2d 467 (1981); Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959).
90. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
91. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
92. Id. at 167.
93. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1057-63 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK].
94. See NOWAK, supra note 93, at 1057-65.
95. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
96. See Note, Choosing For Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Par-
ents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157, 168 (1983).
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the court noted in State v. Miskimens,97 "[a]n important line must be
drawn between the right of an individual to practice his religion by refus-
ing medical treatment for his own illness and that of a parent to practice
his religion by refusing to obtain or permit medical treatment for another
person, i.e., his child."9
In Prince v. Massachusetts,99 the Supreme Court stated:
The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to ex-
pose the community or the child to communicable disease or the
latter to ill health or death .... Parents may be free to become
martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identi-
cal circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they
have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can
make that choice for themselves. °°
In Prince, the Supreme Court held constitutional state statutes that made
it unlawful for a parent or guardian to furnish a minor with articles to
sell in public places,10 ' or for a parent or guardian to permit a minor to
work in violation of the child labor laws.102 A guardian of a minor dis-
tributing the Jehovah's Witnesses' newspaper, the Watchtower, was
found guilty of violating the statute even though the guardian accompa-
nied the minor and both were acting pursuant to their religious beliefs.
The Court stated that "the family itself is not beyond regulation in the
public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty. And neither rights
of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation."103
The state has authority to restrict parental control based on its po-
97. 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio Com. P1. 1984).
98. Id. at 45, 490 N.E.2d at 934 (emphasis in original).
99. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
100. Id. at 166-67, 170.
101. The Massachusetts statute at issue in Prince provided:
Whoever furnishes or sells to any minor any article of any description with the
knowledge that the minor intends to sell such article in violation of any provision of
[the child labor laws] ... or after having received written notice to this effect from
any officer charged with the enforcement thereof, or knowingly procures or encour-
ages any minor to violate any provisions of said sections, shall be punished by a fine
of not less than ten nor more than two hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not
more than two months, or both.
MAss. GEN. LAWS § 80 (1939).
102. The Massachusetts statute also provided:
Any parent, guardian or custodian having a minor under his control who compels or
permits such minor to work in violation of any provision of sections sixty to seventy-
four inclusive,... shall for a first offense be punished by a fine of not less than two
nor more than ten dollars or by imprisonment for not more than five days, or both
Id. at § 81.
103. 321 U.S. at 166. Note that the Prince Court also recognizes rights of parenthood. For
a discussion of the rights of parenthood as guaranteed by the right of privacy, see Note, Cali-
fornia Workfare Legislation and the Right to Privacy, 13 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 761 (1986).
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lice power" andparenspatriae power,105 which give states wide discre-
tion to limit parental freedom and authority in areas affecting a child's
welfare, including, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious
conviction. 0 6 States restrict parental control of their children's religious
beliefs by requiring school attendance, 10 7 regulating or prohibiting child
labor,108 and mandating vaccinations for children.109
B. Establishment of Religion
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
.... )1110 The Establishment Clause applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.' It prohibits governmental sponsorship of
religion: the government cannot aid or formally establish a religion. 12
Over the years the Supreme Court has developed a three-part test to
evaluate establishment clause violations. In order to pass constitutional
muster, the statute must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a primary
secular effect; and (3) not involve the government in an excessive entan-
glement with religion.' 13 The law also must not create political division
along religious lines." 4
If a regulation imposes a burden on persons' religious beliefs in vio-
lation of their free exercise rights, the government may grant a religious
exemption.'" 5 However, any exemption must be drafted broadly enough
so as to reflect a valid secular purpose.1 16
C. Due Process
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, binding the federal gov-
ernment, states: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... ."I17 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution similarly provides: "Nor shall any State deprive
104. See Ewald, Medical Decision Making for Children.: An Analysis of Competing Inter-
ests, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 689, 710 (1982).
105. Parenspatriae has been defined as "literally 'parent of the country,' refer[ring] tradi-
tionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
106. Prince, 321 U.S. at 167.
107. State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901).
108. Prince, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
109. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 191 U.S. 11 (1905).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
111. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
112. See NOWAK, supra note 93, at 1033.
113. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
114. Id. at 622-24.
115. See NOWAK, supra note 93, at 1035.
116. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971).
117. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
. *.".. 118 The Due Process Clauses were designed to preserve individual
freedoms through a check on governmental action.1 9 Two types of due
process exist: procedural due process and substantive due process. Both
protect an individual's interest in life, liberty, and property.120
Procedural due process guarantees that the process the government
uses when it impairs a person's life, liberty, or property be fair. 21 Proce-
dural due process applies to the trial process, 122 the enforcement of
debtor-creditor relationships, 123 and some governmental benefit hear-
ings.1 24 Substantive due process guarantees that the law or action that
the government enacts does not violate the Bill of Rights. 2 ' If the law or
action violates constitutional provisions, the government has acted be-
yond the scope of its legislative authority, and the enacted law limits life,
liberty, and property in violation of the Due Process Clauses.1 2
6
To satisfy procedural due process, the language of a statute must be
definite enough to provide a standard of conduct for those whose activi-
ties are being prohibited. 127 "Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning." 128 If a statute's terms are "so vague, indefinite
and uncertain" that individuals cannot determine its meaning, the statute
violates due process.1 29 "[A] statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that [people] of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, vio-
lates the first essential of due process of law."1 30 The statute must de-
scribe a violation with a reasonable degree of certainty so that an
ordinary person can understand what conduct is prohibited. 31 This is
especially true with criminal statutes: "No one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal stat-
utes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids." 1
32
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
119. L. TRIBE, supra note 84, at 501.
120. NOWAK, supra note 93, at 461-62.
121. Id. at 487.
122. Id. at 487-92.
123. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
124. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
125. NOWAK, supra note 93, at 417.
126. Id. at 418.
127. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1948).
128. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). See also People v. Mirmirani,
30 Cal. 3d 375, 636 P.2d 1130, 178 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1981).
129. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). See also People v. Mirmirani, 30 Cal. 3d
375, 636 P.2d 1130, 178 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1981).
130. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See also People v.
McCaughan, 49 Cal. 2d 409, 317 P.2d 974 (1957).
131. Lanzetta, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
132. Id. at 453.
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D. Independent State Grounds
In regard to religion, the California Constitution provides: "Free
exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference
are guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are
licentious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state. ' 1 33 This
provision is slightly broader than the Federal Constitution's provision for
religious rights, since it also forbids governmental "preference" of reli-
gion; however, the provision is only broader with respect to the estab-
lishment of religion, not the free exercise of religion. 134
California's Constitution also provides for due process: "A person
may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law . . . .135 This provision parallels the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Hence, the California Due Process Clause affords no greater protection
than its federal counterpart. California courts afford the same free exer-
cise and due process protections under the California Constitution as are
afforded under the Federal Constitution.
California courts can decide cases based on rights under the state
constitution:
The courts of California are the exclusive and final arbiters of the
"rights" guaranteed by its Constitution, so long as the interpretive
results they reach extend, to the citizens within their jurisdiction,
equal or greater protection to those extended by the United States
Supreme Court under textually parallel provisions of the federal
Bill of Rights. 13 6
I. The Constitutionality of California's Regulation
of Prayer Healing
A. Free Exercise Clause
The right to believe in prayer healing is absolute, whereas the right
to exercise prayer healing is not absolute.137 However, often religious
beliefs and practices are so integrally related that to deny an individual
the right to the practice of a religion is to deny that individual the right
to believe in that religion.' This interrelationship between religious
practices and beliefs is exemplified by the beliefs and practices of Chris-
tian Scientists and Jehovah's Witnesses. An integral part of the Christian
Scientist creed is belief in healing by spiritual means.139 Christian Scien-
133. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
134. Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
135. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
136. Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 616, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244, 257 (1976).
137. See, eg., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
138. See Comment, supra note 4, at 396-400.
139. See Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 27.
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tists practice the teachings of Mary Baker Eddy, who believed that dis-
eases were cured "by the divine spirit, casting out the errors of mortal
mind."'" Christian Scientists believe that their minds deceive their bod-
ies: by believing they are ill, they inflict the illness on their bodies.1 41
The only way for a Christian Scientist to effectively cure an illness is to
remove the "error" of thinking that the illness exists. 142 However, it is
not a sin for a Christian Scientist to seek medical attention. "A member
who does turn to medicine is not stigmatized or expelled," writes Chris-
tian Science spokesman John Dickson Martin of Indianapolis. "And
though Christian Scientists choose to rely on spiritual means for healing,
they are certainly not 'against doctors'. They are glad medical treatment
is available for those who want it.'1 43 Jehovah's Witnesses believe that it
is a deadly sin to partake the blood of humans or animals,' 44 and hence
do not believe in blood transfusions.145  Many devout Jehovah's Wit-
nesses would rather die than take a needed blood transfusion.
46
The state can regulate the exercise of religion through its role as
parens patriae as long as the state's interest is so substantial that it out-
weighs the individual's interest in the free exercise of religion. I47 The
parenspatriae power was used in the 1903 New York faith healing case,
People v. Pierson.'48 According to the court, the state's interest in peace
and safety requires that the state protect the lives and health of its chil-
dren, as well as require parental obedience to the laws of the state. 49
Pierson established that the state, in its role as parens patriae, has a
highly substantial interest in protecting the lives and well-being of its
children, thereby upholding the state's infringement on Pierson's consti-
tutional right of free exercise of religion.
The state's parens patriae interest has also been invoked when the
state is faced with parents who refuse to allow their children to receive
blood transfusions.'5 0 Many courts have upheld the power of the state to
authorize the administration of a blood transfusion over the parent's reli-
gious objections when the blood transfusion was shown to be necessary
140. M. EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES 138 (1934).
141. See Schneider, Christian Science and the Law: Room for Compromise?, 1 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 81 (1965).
142. Id.
143. Michelson, Christian Science Cases Pose Test of Religious Freedom, L.A. Daily J.,
Sept. 2, 1985, at 1, col. 6, & at 22, col. 1. See also Schneider, supra note 141, at 88.
144. See, e.g., Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 NJ. Super. 517, 520 (1961).
145. Id.
146. See State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 469, 181 A.2d 751, 754 (1962); see also Schneider,
supra note 141, at 82-83.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
148. 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
149. Id. at 205-06, 68 N.E. at 244-45.
150. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952);
Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
for the preservation of the minor's life or for the success of needed
surgery. 15
1
In State v. Perricone,52 the parents of an infant child with an en-
larged heart refused to consent to blood transfusions because of their reli-
gious beliefs as members of the Jehovah's Witness faith. A New Jersey
statute provided for the appointment of a guardian if a child was not
provided with proper care.'53 The trial court appointed a guardian to
consent to the blood transfusions because they were necessary to save the
infant's life or mental health. Another statute' 54 granted parents the
right to provide treatment for ill children in accordance with their reli-
gious tenets. The parents attacked the guardian appointment statute on
the grounds that it violated their right to freely exercise their religious
beliefs. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the guardian appoint-
ment statute did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.' 55 It further held that while the parents were protected from
criminal prosecutions for practicing prayer healing on their children, the
state was not rendered helpless in protecting children.' 56
In 1970, the New York Court of Appeals, in In re Sampson,157 or-
dered surgery to partially correct a child's severe facial deformity despite
his mother's religious objections. The child's mother, a Jehovah's Wit-
ness, objected to the use of blood transfusions on her child. The court's
order was based on its finding that the mother had neglected to provide
proper medical and surgical care.158
A different result under similar facts was reached by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in In re Green.'59 In In re Green, Green would
151. See, ag., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 1967);
People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37
N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d
518 (1974); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961); In re Sampson, 65
Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970).
152. 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
153. The statute provides:
When the parents of any minor child or the parent or other person having actual care
and custody of any minor child are grossly immoral or unfit to be intrusted with the
care and education of such child, or shall neglect to provide the child with proper
protection, maintenance and education, . . . it shall be lawful for any person inter-
ested in the welfare of such child to institute an action in the Superior Court or the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in the county where such minor child is re-
siding, for the purpose of having the child brought before the court, and for the
further relief provided by this chapter. The court may proceed in the action in a
summary manner or otherwise.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-9 (West 1961).
154. Id. at § 9:6-1.1.
155. 37 N.J. at 474, 181 A.2d at 757.
156. Id. at 478, 181 A.2d at 759.
157. 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970).
158. Id. at 656.
159. 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
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not consent to surgery for her son because the surgery required the use of
a blood transfusion, and Green, a Jehovah's Witness, objected to such
blood transfusions. The surgery was necessary to cure the boy's inability
to walk. The court held that the boy's inability to walk was not a threat
to society, thus it would not appoint a guardian to consent to the
surgery. 160
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 6' the Supreme Court balanced the state's
interest in the well-being of children within its jurisdiction and the par-
ents' right in the free exercise of the Amish religion. The Court held that
a Wisconsin statute requiring compulsory school attendance unconstitu-
tionally restricted the religious beliefs of the Amish, who oppose partici-
pation in formal public education past the eighth grade.1 62 The Court
felt that the state's interest in education was readily met by the Amish
system of "informal vocational education," and thus compulsory high
school education was not a state interest substantial enough to restrict
the family's religious beliefs.' 63
The Yoder Court recognized that if a religious practice was detri-
mental to the health or well-being of the child, the state's interest in the
child's welfare would overcome a claim of religious freedom.' 61 There-
fore, the state's interest in protecting the health and welfare of children
may override parents' free exercise of faith healing on their children,
when the faith healing is detrimental to the child's health or well-being.
In accordance with this principle, California also has a strong state
interest in protecting the health and well-being of its children. Califor-
nia's felony child abuse and involuntary manslaughter statutes serve the
state's interest as parens patriae when children's lives are in danger, as
these statutes protect children in life-threatening situations in which only
medical attention might save the child. Although faith healing parents
have a strong interest in practicing their religious beliefs on themselves
and their children, the practice of faith healing sometimes leads to the
endangerment of a child's life. Therefore, prayer healing does not pro-
vide a sufficient alternative to medical care in life-threatening situations,
and the state's interest implicit in Penal Code sections 192 and 273a justi-
fiably and necessarily overrides the parents' free exercise rights.
B. Establishment of Religion
Section 270 of the California Penal Code grants a religious exemp-
tion from the duty to provide medical care, to those parents who practice
faith healing "in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized
160. Id. at 342-43, 292 A.2d at 389.
161. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
162. Id. at 211.
163. Id. at 214-29.
164. Id. at 229-30.
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religion or religious denomination." '165 As the United States Supreme
Court noted in Lemon v. Kurtzman,1 66 an exemption must pass a three-
part test in order to maintain its constitutionality with respect to the
Establishment Clause: (1) it must have a secular purpose; (2) it must
have a primary secular effect; and (3) it must not involve the government
in an excessive entanglement with religion.
1 67
In antoher religious exemption case, Gillette v. United States, 68 the
claimants challenged a statutory exemption to those who by reason of
their religious training and belief opposed participation in all wars. The
claimants, whose religious philosophy required them to refrain only from
participation in unjust wars, charged that the exemption violated the Es-
tablishment Clause. The Gillette Court stated that a religious exemption
could have a secular purpose as long as it was drafted broadly enough. 169
The Court stated that the secular purpose of the Military Service Act in
question was to exclude in the fairest way those persons who were not
available for military service due to their religious beliefs.17 California
Penal Code section 270 is likewise drafted broadly enough to reflect a
valid secular purpose. Section 270's "recognized religion or religious de-
nomination" language was added in order to exclude those parents who
used "other remedial care" instead of modem medicine due to their reli-
gious beliefs. 7 ' Therefore, Penal Code section 270 meets the first prong
of the Lemon test.
In Gillette, the Court held that the primary effect of the Military
Service Act of 1967 was not to aid religion because it did not encourage
any belief.' 72 The Military Service Act of 1967 provides:
Nothing contained in this title... shall be construed to require any
person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form. As used in this subsection, the term "religious training and
belief" does not include essentially political, sociological, or philo-
sophical views, or a merely personal moral code.173
The exemption in Gillette was phrased in terms of "religious train-
ing and belief." It did not go as far as California's statute in only ex-
empting "recognized" religions. Therefore, its primary effect was not to
aid religion. In contrast, the California statute has the primary effect of
165. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
166. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
167. Id. at 612-13. See also supra text accompanying notes 110-116.
168. 401 U.S. 437, reh'g denied, 402 U.S. 934 (1971).
169. Id. at 454.
170. Id. at 452-56.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
172. 401 U.S. at 454.
173. 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (1982).
Winter 19871 PRAYER HEALING
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
encouraging only "recognized" religious beliefs, rather than not encour-
aging any particular belief. Section 270 of the Penal Code therefore fails
the second prong of the Lemon test because it does not have a primary
secular effect.
The Gillette Court held that the military regulation avoided further
entanglement between government and religion because there was less
need to examine the sincerity and character of individual beliefs.1 74 In
contrast, the California regulation requires examination of the individ-
ual's beliefs because an exemption will only be granted to parents who
act "in accordance with the tenets and practices" 175 of a recognized
religion.
In State v. Miskimens,1 76 an Ohio court held that a statute similar to
California Penal Code section 270 violated the Establishment Clause be-
cause it did not meet the requirements of the entanglement prong of the
Lemon test.177 The statute provided in part:
It is not a violation of a duty of care, protection, or support...
when the parent, guardian, custodian, or person having custody or
control of a child treats the physical or mental illness or defect of
such child by spiritual means through prayer alone, in accordance
with the tenets of a recognized religious body. 1
78
The court stated that this provision
hopelessly involves the state in the determination of questions
which should not be the subject of governmental inquisition and
potential public ridicule-questions such as what is a "recognized
religous body," by whom must it be "recognized," what are its ten-
ets, did the accused act in accordance with those tenets, what are
"spiritual means," and what is the effect of combining some prayer
with some treatment or medicine.1 79
The court's language equally applies to the Establishment Clause
analysis of California Penal Code section 270: "The determination of
such issues runs clearly afoul of at least one recognized test for determin-
ing an impermissible establishment problem, i.e., the 'excessive entangle-
ment' test.... ." 8o California Penal Code section 270 therefore fails both
the second and third prongs of the Lemon test in violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause.
174. 401 U.S. at 456-58.
175. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
176. 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio Com. P1. 1984).
177. Id. at 45, 490 N.E.2d at 934.
178. Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Page 1982 & Supp. 1984).
179. 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 45, 490 N.E.2d at 934.
180. Id.
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C. Due Process
California's statutory scheme regarding faith healing must be ex-
amined as a whole in order to analyze whether California Penal Code
section 273a, regarding felony child abuse, and section 192, regarding
involuntary manslaughter, are "so vague, indefinite and uncertain"''
that they violate the Due Process Clauses of the State and Federal
Constitutions.
California statutes provide numerous examples of state support for
religious practitioners and persons depending upon prayer healing. For
instance, under California Business and Professions Code section
2063,182 it is illegal to practice medicine without a license from the State
of California, but the statute does not apply to treatment by prayer. 183
Likewise, the use of unauthorized methods or drugs for treatment of can-
cer is prohibited by California Health and Safety Code section 1709,184
but exempts religious practitioners and "any person [who] depends ex-
clusively upon prayer for healing .... ,185 The health services of reli-
gious practitioners are covered by Medi-Cal and Medicaid under
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 14000.186 Finally, Cali-
fornia Welfare and Institutions Code section 16509 states: "Cultural and
religious child-rearing practices and beliefs which differ from general
community standards shall not in themselves create a need for child wel-
fare services unless the practices present a specific danger to the physical
or emotional safety of the child."' 87
Although a layperson cannot be expected to comprehend the nu-
ances of every statute, 188 the existence of these statutes-in addition to
Penal Code section 270, which exempts faith healing parents from misde-
181. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. at 451.
182. The statute states:
Nothing in this chapter [Medicine] shall be construed so as to discriminate against
any particular school of medicine or surgery, school or college of podiatric medicine,
or any other treatment, nor shall it regulate, prohibit, or apply to any kind of treat-
ment by prayer, nor interfere in any way with the practice of religion.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2063 (West Supp. 1986).
183. Id.
184. This statute provides:
The failure of any individual, person, firm, association, or other entity representing
himself, or itself, as engaged in the diagnosis, treatment, alleviation, or cure of cancer
to comply with any of the regulations promulgated under this chapter [Cancer] is a
misdemeanor.... The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person who
depends exclusively upon prayer for healing in accordance with the teachings of a
bona fide religious sect, denomination, or organization, nor practitioner thereof.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1709 (West 1979).
185. Id.
186. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14000 (West Supp. 1987).
187. Id. at § 16509.
188. State v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 47-48, 490 N.E.2d 931, 937 (Ohio Com. Pl.
1984).
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meanor charges for denying their children medical care-might indicate
to the layperson that Penal Code sections 273a and 192 are inapplicable
to faith healing cases. Due process requires notice to defendants that
their conduct is criminal. 189 However, section 270 is the only criminal
statute that mentions religious treatment, and it grants an exemption if
religious treatment is used. Section 270's religious exemption condones
the practice of faith healing but does not warn faith healing parents of
potential criminal prosecutions for manslaughter or felony child abuse.
D. Independent State Grounds
California's Constitution provides the same protections to its citi-
zens in the areas of free exercise of religion and due process of law as
does the United States Constitution. 9 ' Therefore, California courts have
used the same analysis of free exercise and due process claims as the
federal courts. 9 ' Since California's prayer healing regulation does not
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitution, 192 yet vio-
lates the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution, 193 it necessarily
follows that the legislation does not violate the free exercise provisions of
the California Constitution, but violates the due process provision of the
California Constitution.
The California Constitution provides broader protections against
the establishment of religion than does the United States Constitution
because it prohibits not only the establishment, but also the preference of
religion.194 Therefore, California courts have utilized a slightly broader
analysis in establishment claims. 19 However, since California's prayer
healing exemption violates the Establishment Clause of the Federal Con-
stitution, 196  it will necessarily violate the broader California
Constitution. 197
189. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1953).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 133-136.
191. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 156 Cal. App. 3d 719, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 812 (1984); Erzinger v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 137 Cal. App. 3d 389, 187 Cal. Rptr.
164 (1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983); In re Edward C., 126 Cal. App. 3d 193, 178
Cal. Rptr. 694 (1981); Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1975).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 137-164.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 181-189.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 133-134.
195. See, e.g., Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 807
(1978); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Philibosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 918 (1984); Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 165-180.
197. See supra text accompanying note 136.
IV. A Proposal to Amend California's Statute
California should amend the California Penal Code to alleviate the
statute's problems with both the Establishment Clause and the Due Pro-
cess Clause by incorporating parts of the Military Service Act of 1967198
and Oklahoma's faith healing exemption199 into the present section 270.
The proposed amended statute would read as follows: "If a parent pro-
vides a minor with treatment by spiritual means alone by reason of reli-
gious training or belief, such treatment shall constitute 'other remedial
care,' as used in this section, provided, that medical care shall be pro-
vided where permanent physical damage could result to such child."
By substituting the "by reason of religious training or belief" lan-
guage from the Military Service Act of 1967 for "in accordance with the
tenets and practices of a recognized religion or denomination," the stat-
ute should pass establishment clause challenges. The Military Service
Act language has already passed constitutional muster in Gillette v.United States.2°°
Oklahoma's Title 10, section 1130B20 1 provides:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to mean a child is endan-
gered for the sole reason the parent or guardian, in good faith,
selects and depends upon spiritual means alone through prayer, in
accordance with the tenets and practice of a recognized church or
religious denomination for the treatment or cure of disease or re-
medial care of such child; provided, that medical care shall be pro-
vided where permanent physical damage could result to such child;
and that the laws, rules and regulations relating to communicable
diseases and sanitary matters are not violated."' 2
This statute is more effective than California's faith healing statute
because the Oklahoma statute clearly states that the religious exemption
will not apply "where permanent physical damage could result to such
child. '2 03 California law presently specifies no such limitation to the reli-
gious exemption in Penal Code section 270. The Oklahoma statute pro-
vides for a religious exemption so that parents are able to practice their
religious beliefs without violating the law; however, it also specifically
provides for the use of medical care when the child's life is in danger." 4
Although California lower courts have recently interpreted California's
198. See supra text accompanying note 173.
199. See infra text accompanying note 201.
200. 401 U.S. 437, reh'g denied, 402 U.S. 934 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes
168-175.
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statutory scheme in this manner,2 °5 the statute does not inform faith
healing parents of their duty to provide medical care; thus, the statute
violates their due process right to notice of criminal conduct.20
6
Conclusion
Prayer healing pits the individual's rights of free exercise and due
process against the state's rights as parens patriae to protect the well-
being of children within its jurisdiction, and the state's duty not to un-
constitutionally establish religion. Parents have a right to choose their
own religious beliefs and to exercise them freely. They also have a due
process right to fair and adequate notice that their exercise of religious
practices may be curtailed, and criminalized, by the state.
Although parents' rights to believe in faith healing is absolute, their
right to exercise it on their children is not. In certain circumstances, the
state's interest in children's health and well-being is substantial enough
to outweigh the parents' right to exercise their belief in faith healing.
So as not to violate the parents' due process rights, parents must be
warned that in life-threatening situations, practicing faith healing on
their children, without providing medical care, is prohibited. Califor-
nia's statutory scheme does not adequately warn parents that their con-
duct may be prohibited, thus the statutory scheme violates their due
process rights.
The state must also be careful not to establish religion in its accom-
modation of individuals' free exercise rights. The California statutory
scheme violates the Establishment Clause by granting an exemption only
to faith healers of "recognized" religions, thereby establishing "recog-
nized" religions over "unrecognized" religions.
The proposed statute should serve as a model to California and
other states. It provides for the practice of faith healing, protecting indi-
viduals' rights to free exercise of religion, however it does not allow the
use of prayer healing alone where the child risks suffering permanent
physical harm. Thus, the proposed statute properly balances the individ-
ual and state interests involved, without overcompensating for the indi-
vidual interests by exempting those who practice faith healing by reason
of their religious training or beliefs. It also notifies individuals of exactly
when the balance tips in favor of the state's interest: when the child's
physical well-being is threatened. If enacted, the proposed statute would
protect the parents' free exercise of prayer healing to the fullest extent
possible without establishing "recognized" religions, while simultane-
205. In Walker v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 274-75, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 91, the
court held that the legislature's intent in amending Penal Code section 270 was not to provide
a religious exemption for homicide.
206. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617.
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ously providing parents with due process protection by adequate notice
of prohibited conduct.
By JoAnna A. Gekas*
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